Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

Tracy L. Miller v. Larry T. Miller : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
W. Kevin Jackson; Jensen, Duffin, Carman, Dibb and Jackson; Attorney for Appellant.
James H. Woodall; Suzanne Marelius; Littlefield and Peterson; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Miller v. Miller, No. 2000313 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2523

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CASE NO. 2000313 CA

TRACY L. MILLER,
Petitioner and Appellant,
-vs-

Priority No. 15

LARRY T. MILLER,
Respondent and Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
(Consolidated Cases)
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah
The Honorable David S. Young, Third District Court Judge

James H.Woodall( #5361)
Suzanne Marelius (#2081)
Littlefield & Peterson
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 531-0435; Fax: 575-7834
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee
W. Kevin Jackson
Jensen, Duffin, Carman, Dibb & Jackson
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379
(801) 531-6600 Fax:
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

OCT 3 1 2000
Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CASE NO. 2000313 CA

TRACY L. MILLER,
Petitioner and Appellant,
-vs-

Priority No. 15

LARRY T. MILLER,
Respondent and Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
(Consolidated Cases)
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah
The Honorable David S. Young, Third District Court Judge

James H. Woodall( #5361)
Suzanne Marelius (#2081)
Littlefteld & Peterson
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 531-0435; Fax: 575-7834
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee
W. Kevin Jackson
Jensen, Duffin, Carman, Dibb & Jackson
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379
(801) 531-6600 Fax:
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv-v

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

A.
B.

The Issues Presented on Appeal as to Civil Contempt
and Related Sanctions

2

The Issues Presented on Appeal as to the Divorce Action
and the Decree of Divorce

3

STANDARD OF REVIEW

5

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

6

STATEMENT OF FACTS

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

13

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF PETITIONER'S
CONTEMPT WERE CORRECT AND SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED ON APPEAL

16

A.
B.
C.

16

Was there proper jurisdiction over the party and
subject matter?

17

Is mailing the contempt motion sufficient service under
the Utah rules?

18

Did the trial court hold a "meaningful evidentiary
hearing" on contempt and were the elements of civil
contempt met in this case?

19

-i-

D.

Was the failure to personally serve the OSC a fatal
defect?

23

Was a clear order in place which was violated by the
Petitioner's 1999 Halloween visitation contempt?

23

Was there acquiescence in the contemptuous conduct
by the complaining party?

24

THE TRIAL COURT CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE
EVIDENCE AS TO MR. MILLER'S INCOME AND NO
"ADVERSE INFERENCE" SHOULD BE DRAWN FROM
THE EVIDENCE OR LACK THEREOF

27

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE CHILD
SUPPORT GUIDELINES IN THIS CASE

31

WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO VERIFY
THE GROSS INCOME OF MR. MILLER UNDER THE
SUPPORT GUIDELINES?

32

IT IS IRRELEVANT TO THESE PROCEDURES
WHETHER THE CHILDREN WORK FOR RESPONDENT
IN A "HAZARDOUS OCCUPATION WITHOUT
CONSENT OF THE STATE"

32

THE TRIAL COURT'S ALLOCATIONS OF THE INCOME
TAX EXEMPTION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED

33

THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT NOT TO AWARD
ALIMONY WAS APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED

34

THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY WAS APPROPRIATE
AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED

35

THE ATTORNEY FEE AND COSTS AWARDED TO
RESPONDENT AT TRIAL SHOULD NOT BE
DISTURBED ON APPEAL

36

E.
F.

-ii-

A.

The attorney fee award to Respondent should
not be disturbed on appeal

36

The cost award should not be disturbed on
appeal

37

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AWARD OF
INTEREST ON CHILD SUPPORT IN THIS CASE

38

PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT SPECIFIC JUDGMENT
DEBTOR INFORMATION WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE
DECREE IS MOOT

38

THE PETITIONER FAILED TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE WHICH IS FATAL TO THE APPEAL AND
RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS FEES ON
APPEAL

38

B.

X.

XI.

XII.

CONCLUSION

39

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

41

ADDENDUM

42

-iii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Bolligerv. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47

39

Boggs v. Boggs, 1991 UT App 824 P.2d 478

17

Breinholt v. Breinholt, 1995 UT App 905 P.2d 877, 882

39

Coleman v. Colman, 1983 UT 664 P.2d 1155

16

Cummings v. Cummings, 1991 UT App 821 P.2d 472

28

D'Aston v. D'Aston, 1990 UT App 790 P.2d 590

19

Dansie v. Dansie, 1999 UT App 977 P.2d 539, 540

5

Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 1999 UT App 977 P.2d 1226

29

Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 973, P.2d 988

16

Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 973 P.2d 431

39

Muir v. Muir, 1992 UT App 841 P.2d 736, 741

36

Naranjo v. Naranjo, 1988 UT App 751 P.2d 1144, 1146

35

Newmeyerv. Newmeyer, 1987 UT 745 P.2d 1276, 1277

29

Nikon v. Nikon, 1982 UT 652 P.2d 1323, 1324

37

Rudman v. Rudman, 1991 UT App 812 P.2d 73,79

39

State v. Casias, 1989 UT App 722 P.2d 975
Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dept. Of Transportation, 1995 UT 896 P.2d 632
-iv-

5
5

Watson v. Watson, UT 1992 837 P.2d 1,5

35

Wilde v. Wilde, 1998 UT App 969 P.2d 438, 444

36

Von Hake v. Thomas, 1988 UT 759 P.2d 1162

16

West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 1991 UT App., 818 P.2d. 1311,1313

16

STATUTES
§78-32-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated (Contempt Statute)
§78-45-7.2(2) Utah Code Annotated (Child Support Guidelines)

16
31, 32

§78-45-7.21 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated (Tax Dependent Exemptions)

33

§30-3-5(7)(c) Utah Code Annotated (Alimony Statute)

34

-v-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRIEF OF
APPELLEE

TRACY L.MILLER,
Petitioner and Appellant,
-vsi

CASE NO. 2000313 CA

LARRY T. MILLER,
Respondent and Appellee

Priority 15

Respondent Larry T. Miller (hereinafter "Respondent" or "Mr. Miller") submits the
following brief as Appellee in this matter:
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 and 4 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure and §78-2a-3(2)(h) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1998).
Petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal to this Court on or about April 4, 2000.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Respondent accepts the Statement of the Issues presented for review as set forth
in Appellant's Brief and simply restates those issues herein for convenience of the Court.
The issues stated by Appellant for the appeal are as follows:
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A.

The Issues Presented on Appeal as to Civil Contempt and Related Sanctions.
1.

Whether the District Court obtained subject matter and personal jurisdiction

over the Appellant under the Orders to Show Cause under the controlling facts of the case.
(Contempt Trial pp. 50 to 51, and to 56; Record pp. 1246 to 1248, and 1266 to 1290).
2.

Whether the Respondent complied with the mandatory provisions of UCA

§78-32-1 et. seq. regarding contempt and any related sanctions. (Record pp. 1246 to
1248).
3.

Whether the conduct actually complained about can support a claim of

contempt as a matter of law and under the Decree of Divorce. (Record pp. 46 to 48).
4.

Whether the elements of civil contempt as to specific events was proven by

clear and convincing evidence. (Record p. 1246 to 1248, and 1266 to 1290).
5.

Whether there were adequate findings of facts made by the trial court and

whether they are sufficient to support its ruling and any subsequent punishment regarding
contempt. (Record pp. 1246 to 1248).
6.

Whether Respondent acquiesced to the conduct and if this constituted a

defense (in whole or in part) to the claim of contempt. (Record pp. 1246 to 1248, and
1266 to 1290).
7.

Whether the District Court acted properly by requiring the Petitioner to

present her evidence in defense of contempt before the Respondent presented even a prima
facie case of contempt. (Contempt Trial pp. 54 to 55).
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8.

Whether under state law and the facts the Appellant was afforded due

process of law. (Contempt Trial pp. 42 to 43 and 49 to 57). (Record pp. 1246 to 1248).
9.

Whether the trial court should have awarded the wife her attorney's fees

incurred in defending the contempt matter on account of the failure of the moving party
to comply with the mandatory provisions of UCA §78-32-1 et. seq. (Record pp. 1294 to
1301).
B.

The Issues Presented on Appeal as to the Divorce Action and the Decree of
Divorce.
1.

Whether the District Court properly vacated the wife's temporary spousal

support award that had accrued during the pendency of the case. (Record pp. 1139 to
1148).
2.

Whether the wife was properly denied a permanent award of alimony in light

of the length of the marriage and the disparate earning abilities and demonstrated disparate
financial resources which are available to the parties. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148).
3.

Whether the property division was reasonable in light of the facts of the case

and earning abilities of the parties, taking into account the income producing nature of the
assets and the award of the business assets to the Respondent. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148).
4.

Whether the District Court failed to find that the Respondent's income was

at least $5,000.00 per month based upon the evidence, admissions, and admitted trial
exhibits. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148).
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5.

Whether the Court awarded sufficient attorney's fees to the wife in light of

the facts of this case and the difficulty in ascertaining the Respondent's true and verifiable
current and historical income due to his admitted use of corporations and nominee trusts.
(Record pp. 1139 to 1148).
6.

Whether child support award was properly computed based upon the actual

and historical income of the parties as shown by the trial evidence. (Record pp. 1139 to
1148).
7.

Whether the Court failed to recognize and then treat as the income of the

Respondent the corporate, trust, and business funds paid or diverted to numerous third
parties. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148).
8.

Whether the Court took into account the fact that the Respondent has

significant premarital income producing real estate and that such was required to be taken
into account in setting the level of child support and alimony. (Record 1139 to 1148).
9.

Whether the Respondent had an affirmative duty under the law to provide

current and historic financial information so that his support obligations could be
determined and whether he breached such duty, and whether the adverse inference rule
was properly applied by the Trial Court. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148, and 1554 to 1156).
10.

Whether the Court properly awarded the tax exemption to a spouse who

admits he does not file tax returns and has no actual need for the same. (Record pp. 1139
to 1148).
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11.

Whether the Court should have awarded prejudgment interest on the support

arrearages at 10% compounded monthly. (Record p. 1142).
12.

Whether the Court properly applied the law to the facts of the case. (Record

pp. 1139 to 1148).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing divorce matters generally, trial courts may exercise broad discretion
which will not be disturbed on appeal so long as it is within the confines of legal
precedent, and absent manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear "abuse of
discretion". State v. Casias, 1989 UT App 772 P.2d 975.
This Court must review the trial court's legal interpretation of statutes such as the
contempt and alimony statutes, for "correctness." Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dept. Of
Transportation, 1995 UT 896 P.2d 632.
Petitioner raises the specific issue of contempt. A decision to hold a party in
contempt is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
disturbed on appeal unless the trial court's action is "so unreasonable as to be classified
as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of discretion." Dansie v. Dansie, 1999 UT
App 977 P.2d 539, 540.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following are determinative statutory provisions referenced in this brief:
1.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

§30-3-5(a) (alimony statute)

2.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

§78-32-1 (contempt)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third Judicial District Court. The
divorce decree was entered November 8,1999 after a two-day bench trial. A subsequent
evidentiary hearing was held February 25, 2000 where the Court denied Petitioner's
motion for new trial and found Petitioner in contempt of the terms of the divorce decree.
The parties were married 18 years and had three children together. The parties were
awarded joint legal custody of the children and split physical custody, with Petitioner
having the youngest daughter and Respondent having the older two boys. No alimony was
ordered and under the split custody support worksheet, Petitioner was ordered to pay
Respondent $46 per month as child support. Shortly after entry of the Decree, Petitioner
failed and refused to abide by the terms of the Court Order and Respondent filed two
successive Orders to Show Cause primarily concerning visitation and property issues.
Petitioner was found in contempt on both occasions.
The parties acquired a modest marital estate consisting of a residence in Riverton
and beauty salon equipment, which was awarded to Petitioner, and business equipment and
an equitable interest in a parcel of real estate in Sandy titled in his mother's name, which
was awarded to Respondent. The primary disputes at trial were the determination of
Respondent's incomefromhis self-employment as an excavator and valuing the business
equipment and real properties.
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During the pendency of the case, the Commissioner entered an award of temporary
alimony of $400 per month. Respondent filed a timely objection and the temporary order
was overturned at trial. Respondent stipulated to a judgment for child support arrears of
$8,483.36.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Respondent submits the following statement of facts in this matter:
1.

The parties were married eighteen (18) years and have had three children

together.
2.

The Decree of Divorce was based on irreconcilable differences and the Court

made an award of joint legal custody and split physical custody where Petitioner was
awarded sole custody of the child Stephanie (DOB 7/10/91) and Respondent was awarded
sole custody of the children Jaren (DOB 12/01/83) and Brady (06/25/85). The Court
ordered that each party exercise visitation with children as the parties and the children are
able to agree, but no less frequently than the Statewide Minimum Schedule contained at
UC A §30-30-35. Additionally, the Court ruled that the children were to be given "leeway"
to determine the amount of time they spend with either parent, and where they reside, and
the parties are to respect the children's desires. (Decree of Divorce, %L, Record Page 34;
Addendum No. 1).
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Incomes and Support Orders
3.

The Petitioner is employed as a cosmetologist. The Court found she had the

ability to earn $1,500 gross per month, which is not challenged on appeal. (Decree of
Divorce, ^[20, Record Page 49, Addendum No. 1).
4.

The Respondent works as a heavy equipment operator/excavator and is self-

employed under the business name of LTM, Inc. The Court found Respondent earned
$2,500 per month gross monthly incomefromthis occupation. (Decree of Divorce f20,33;
Record Pages 49, 52, Addendum No. 1).
5.

Based on the incomes of the parties and using a split custody worksheet, the

Court found Petitioner should pay child support to Respondent of $46 per month, but that
such amount should be applied to Respondent's child support arrearages until those have
been fully satisfied. The Court set forth gradually increasing support amounts up to $293
per month when only one child remained. The Court found Respondent's arrears in prior
child support payments to be $8,483.36 and entered a judgment in that amount. (Decree
of Divorce, ^[13, 29; Record Pages 37, 41, Addendum No. 1).
6.

The Court found that no alimony was warranted in this case as the parties'

incomes and needs were comparable and neither had the ability to pay alimony to the other.
Additionally, the Court found that the Temporary Alimony Order of $400 per month
entered June 23, 1995 by the Commissioner was improper and granted Respondent's
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objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation. (Decree of Divorce, ^{30; Record
Page 41, Addendum No. 1).
Real Property Division
7.

Petitioner was awarded the marital residence in Riverton, Utah, which the

Court found had equity of $93,000. Respondent was awarded property in Sandy, Utah,
which the Court found had an equity of $34,000. Respondent was also awarded his
premarital, separate properties consisting of two parcels of real estate. (Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, ^[28, 29, 30; Record Pages 50, 51; Addendum No. 2).
Personal and Business Property
8.

The Court awarded Respondent his business equipment and assets held in

the name of LTM, Inc., a Utah corporation, including all trusts he formed during the
parties' marriage relating to the business and containing business equipment, inventory and
accounts. The Court valued these business assets at $76,000. (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, ^[33, Record Page 52, Addendum No. 2). Petitioner was awarded her
salon equipment and personal property valued at $ 12,700. (Record 1370, Transcript page.
349).
Tax Exemptions
9.

The Court awarded each parent the tax exemption for the children in their

home, thus awarding Respondent two exemptions and Petitioner one. The Court also
determined that since Respondent had not filed income taxes consistently that if either
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party failed to file a return by May 1st or if either party did not benefit from the exemption
awarded to them, that the other party should be entitled to claim all three children as
dependents. (Decree of Divorce, ^15, Record Page 38, Addendum No. 1).
Contempt Hearing - Commissioner Evans - December 7, 1999
10.

After entry of the Decree November 9,1999, Respondent filed an Order to

Show Cause for Contempt which was heard before Commissioner Michael S. Evans
December 7,1999. Respondent requested the following relief:
-* That Petitioner return a computer she removed from Respondent's home
November 10,1999
-*

That Petitioner be found in contempt for involving the minor child Brady in
the dispute by instructing him to bring the computer outside to her.

-* That Petitioner be found in contempt for taking the child Stephanie from
Respondent during a hockey game without telling him.
->

Restraining Petitioner from coming about Respondent's property, other than
for visitation.

-* Restraining Petitioner from approaching the children or inviting them to
abandon Respondent when they are in his custody.
-* Awarding Respondent make-up visitation for Halloween.
-* An award of $350 in attorneys fees.
11.

To initiate the contempt motion, Respondent filed a Motion for Order to

Show Cause and a Memorandum in Support (Addendum No. 6). These, along with the
issued Ordered to Show Cause with Notice of Hearing were mailed to opposing counsel.
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12.

A hearing was held December 7, 1999 before Commissioner Michael S.

Evans. Both parties and counsel were present. The Commissioner ruled that despite
Respondent's physical presence in Court, he was precluded from certifying contempt
without an Affidavit on file. Although the Court commented that Petitioner's behavior
involving the children in removing personal property she wantedfromRespondent's home
clearly rose to the level of contempt, that her contempt be reserved. (Recommendation,
Order and Judgment Record Page 64; Addendum No. 4).
13.

The Court, sua sponte, ordered Petitioner not to submit Affidavits from any

of the minor children and found her effort to file an Affidavit purportedly written by the
eight-year old child to be highly inappropriate and a violation of Tfl2 of the Decree. The
Commissioner granted the request for a restraining order, awarded make-up visitation for
Halloween and awarded attorneys fees of $350. (Recommendation, Order and Judgment,
Record Pages 64-66, Addendum No. 4).
Contempt - Commissioner Evans - January 24. 2000
14.

Respondent filed a second Motion for Order to Show Cause and

Memorandum in Support, which was heard by Commissioner Evans January 24, 2000.
The Memorandum filed by Respondent was verified and in paragraph 5 specifically stated
that all factual allegations proffered to the Court in the December 7th hearing were true and
correct (Addendum No. 5). The following requests were made by Respondent in that
Motion:
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-* That Petitioner be found in contempt for coming to Respondent's property
December 29,1999 in direct contravention of the Court's ruling made at the
hearing December 7, 1999.
-* That Petitioner be found in contempt for taking the children from
Respondent's custody December 20, 1999 in direct contravention of the
Court's ruling made December 7,1999.
-*

That Petitioner be found in contempt for removing the children from school
December 21 and 22,1999, without Respondent's consent.

•4

That Petitioner be found in contempt for denying Respondent all visitation
with the eight-year old child Stephanie since the hearing December 7,1999.

-*

Certifying all issues regarding Petitioner's contempt which were reserved at
the December 7,1999 hearing.

-*

Ordering Petitioner to pay $3 50 in attorneys fees (OSC, Record page 61-63,
Addendum No. 4).

15.

This Motion for Contempt was heard by Commissioner Michael S. Evans

January 24,2000. He certified all Respondent's issues for further contempt hearing before
Judge Young (Addendum No. 4).
Contempt Hearing - Judge Young - February 25, 2000
16.

Judge David S. Young held an evidentiary hearing to review the

certifications of contempt made in the above-referenced hearings before Commissioner
Evans. The Judge denied Petitioner's procedural objections regarding jurisdiction,
personal service, and lack of an affidavit and held Petitioner in contempt in the following
respects:
-* For denying visitation with the child Stephanie during Halloween, 1999.
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-* For taking Stephanie from Respondent's custody at the hockey game,
November 20, 1999 without notice.
-• For taking Respondent's personal computer November 10,1999.
-# For encouraging Stephanie, age 8, to prepare an affidavit against
Respondent without even notifying the Guardian ad Litem.
-4

For coming to Respondent's property December 20,1999 in violation of the
Court's Restraining Order issued December 7, 1999 and removing the
children from his custody.

-4 For removing the childrenfromschool December 21 and 22,1999 without
Respondent's consent.
17.

As sanctions for contempt, the Court did not order j ail as Respondent did not

request it, even though the Court expressed the opinion that ten (10) days in jail would
have been appropriate under the facts of the case stating that this hearing was at least the
fifth time Petitioner's contempt for such conduct had been certified during the pendency
of the matter. The Court ordered Petitioner to pay the attorneys fees and costs that
Respondent incurred and entered judgment for $1,868.75. The Court admonished
Petitioner that a jail term would be imposed if there were any similar violations in the
future. (Addendum No. 3).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner claims the Contempt Orders are defective as the Orders to Show Cause
were only mailed to Petitioner's counsel, rather than personally served. Additionally,
neither was supported by Affidavit, although Respondent appeared in person at the
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hearings, and filed verified pleadings. Respondent submits that the Verified Memorandum
dated December 27,1999 specifically referencing the facts in the two post-trial contempt
hearings are the equivalent of an Affidavit. This was the finding of the Commissioner and
the Trial Court and the contempt ruling should stand.
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in setting child support, alimony and in
allocating the marital assets of the parties. There was conflicting testimony and evidence
regarding incomes of the parties and the Trial Court's ruling is supported by substantial
evidence in the record. The testimony of Petitioner that Respondent earns substantially
more was without consideration of his operating expenses and unsupported by evidence
other than Petitioner's testimony. The Court deemed Respondent's evidence consisting
ofprofit and loss statements, business reports, equipment summaries, financial declaration,
and testimony to be more credible, under the circumstances and no abuse of discretion
occurred. Petitioner has provided no legal support for the contention that Respondent was
"required" to provide verifiable evidence of his income on an annualized basis and the
Court found sufficient other evidence to determine incomes in this case. There was thus
no error in applying the "adverse inference rule" in this case.
The Trial Court did not commit error in awarding the tax exemptions on a split basis
based on the split custody herein. The Court has discretion in this area and there is no
legal support for Petitioner's claims of error.
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The Trial Court properly vacated the temporary spousal support in this matter and
there was no error in failing to award Petitioner a judgment for arrearages. The
Respondent had properly objected to the Commissioner's temporary order and properly
preserved the issue for trial. Based on the trial evidence, the Court vacated the temporary
order. The Trial Court's determination to award no alimony was reasonable based on the
incomes determined by the Trial Court and circumstances of the parties.
The Trial Court did not err in its division of marital assets. Each party was awarded
both real and personal property of significant value and the Court correctly found that
Petitioner had no claim to premarital assets of Respondent. There was no abuse of
discretion in this property award.
The Trial Court awarded attorneys fees to Petitioner in the amount of $4,000
primarily due to the fact that her counsel withdrew a week before trial and new counsel
incurred significant costs for trial preparation. This amount has been paid, but is
challenged on appeal as inadequate. The Trial Court considered the fee petition and
circumstances of the parties and made a ruling supported by substantial evidence, and had
a reasonable basis for its award of fees, which should not be disturbed on appeal.
The Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence for this appeal. The Appellate
Court cannot determine whether the findings are erroneous or whether the exercise of trial
court discretion was proper, unless the appealing party properly marshals evidence. This
Court has defined the marshaling requirement as requiring the Appellant to cite "every
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scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial" that supports the Trial Court's findings.
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 1991 UT App., 818 P.2d. 1311,1313. It is also
evident that what facts the Petitioner does include are one-sided and are selected facts
favorable to her position, rather than properly marshaled evidence. It is significant that
Petitioner does not even attempt to marshal evidence in any section of her brief and does
not reference that requirement at any time. Based on the failure to marshal evidence and
other factors, Respondent should be awarded his fees on appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF PETITIONER'S CONTEMPT
WERE CORRECT AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON APPEAL.

The decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court's action "is so
unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary or a clear abuse of discretion."
Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 973, P.2d 988. Section 78-32-1 UCA, sets forth the acts
and omissions constituting contempt and it is well settled that a finding of contempt by a
trial court must be supported by clear and convincing proof that the party knew what was
required, that he had the ability to comply, and that he willfully and knowingly failed and
refused to do so. Coleman v. Coleman, 1983 UT 664 P.2d 1155. Additionally, the trial
court must enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to each of the
substantive elements of contempt. Von Hake v. Thomas, 1988 UT 759 P.2d 1162. The
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Petitioner alleges numerous errors occurred in the procedure underlying Respondent's
post-trial contempt motions and the subsequent court orders. When analyzed, it is clear the
trial court made no errors and did not abuse its discretion in this area. The Petitioner's
allegations of error will be considered in turn.
A.

Was there proper jurisdiction over the party and subject matter?

There were two post-trial contempt motions filed by Respondent and heard
by the Commissioner. An evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Young on
February 25,2000 on all issues certified by the Commissioner. Both of the Respondent's
Motions were initiated by filing a Motion for Contempt setting forth the specific contempt
requests and facts underlying each request. No affidavits were filed but the Memorandum
in Support of Order to Show Cause for the second hearing was verified and signed by
Respondent and specifically referenced all factual allegations in the earlier Motion and
Memorandum. The Petitioner contends that because there was no pleading titled
"affidavit", the motions do not meet the requirement of a proper contempt pleading. This
argument is merely one of form over substance and should be ignored. Respondent agrees
that it is necessary in a contempt proceeding not committed in the presence of the Court,
that an affidavit OR equivalent verified pleading be filed setting forth specific facts and
contempt requests. A verified pleading is entitled to the same authority as an affidavit.
Both are signed and sworn before a notary and frequently a verification contains even
more recitals setting forth the nature and purpose of the document. The case of Boggs v.
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Boggs, 1991 UT App 824 P.2d 478, involved a verified petition filed with the Court
seeking to have child support increased, support arrears entered and the petition also
contained allegations that the husband's failure to pay support was contemptuous. In its
decision, the Court found flaws with the failure to provide specific notice that the hearing
would involve contempt issues, but was not troubled by the fact that the contempt action
was initiated by way of Verified Petition rather than an Affidavit.
In the present case, there were no less than two contempt hearings before the
Commissioner prior to an evidentiary hearing before the Judge several months later. Both
parties and counsel personally participated in both hearings. Respondent's verified
Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for Order to show Cause dated
December 24,1999 adequately supports all the contempt issues ruled on by the trial court
(Addendum No. 6). It is thus evident that the required notice of contempt and opportunity
to meet the allegations in a proper setting was fully afforded to Petitioner in this case. The
challenge to subject matter and personal jurisdiction are thus without merit.
B.

Is mailing the contempt motion sufficient service under the Utah
rules?

Petitioner asserts error by the trial court by allowing the evidentiary hearing
on contempt to take place without her being personally served with process. In this case,
both motions for contempt were handled in the same manner, by mailing all pleadings to
opposing counsel. Petitioner contends that a contempt action is a "new" matter and thus
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there is no personal or subject matter jurisdiction unless a party is served. In the instant
case, there was no break in the proceedings and thus no need to initiate a new action to
acquire new contempt jurisdiction. The trial ended November 8, 1999 and a contempt
motion filed ten days later and contempt hearing held within one month of trial. Under
these circumstances, the Court never lost jurisdiction over the parties and no new service
was required. Moreover, the case of D'Aston v. D'Aston 1990 UT App 790 P.2d 590
addressed exactly this issue and held that service of the order to show cause on the wife's
attorney in that case was sufficient where the wife had initially been served with process
and appeared by counsel in the matter.
C.

Did the trial court hold a "meaningful evidentiary hearing" on
contempt and were the elements of civil contempt met in this case.

It is clear that the Court held complete and sufficient hearings in this case to
review the allegations of contempt and entered sufficient findings to hold Petitioner in
contempt. Respondent filed two motions for Order to Show Cause, on November 18,1999
and December 28, 1999. These matters were heard before Commissioner Evans and
certified for evidentiary hearing on December 7,1999 and January 24,2000, respectively.
A full day evidentiary hearing was conducted February 25, 2000 before Judge David S.
Young with all counsel and parties participating. Petitioner now contends that the
Respondent has not established di prima facie case as to why five of the factual findings
of the Court constituted contempt. In essence, Petitioner alleges that the trial court abused
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its discretion infindingher in contempt based on insufficient evidence at these hearings.
Respondent submits that the record reveals clear and convincing evidence to support the
trial court'sfindingswhich should be affirmed herein. The specific contempt episodes will
be discussed in turn.
(1)

Halloween Visitation 1999. In accordance with the visitation

schedule in effect by Court Order, Respondent was entitled to Halloween with his daughter
Stephanie during the weekend of October 29-31,1999. It is undisputed that the child did
not visit Respondent as required and undisputed that he did not agree to miss the visit for
any reason. Petitioner's defense was that the eight-year old child "chose" to spend
Halloween with other friends and her brother rather than visit her father despite the
mother's encouragement. The Decree clearly states that the standard schedule is the
minimum visitation time with both parents. The children are not given the choice to opt
out of or to change the schedule, rather they are to be given "leeway to determine the
amount of time they spend with either parent..." If the parents do not agree, then the
standard schedule is to be followed. (Decree f3, R. 35, Addendum No. 1).
(2)

Removal of Computer. The trial court found Petitioner in

contempt for removing a computerfromRespondent's home and that she compounded that
contempt by enlisting the minor children of the parties to enter the home and remove the
computer while she sat in the car. It is undisputed that Petitioner knew she was restrained
from access to the home and that Petitioner enlisted the children to circumvent the clear
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Order of the Court that she not come onto the Respondent's property. The trial court
found that Petitioner knew that removing the computer would create a serious problem, but
she went ahead despite that fact. (Order in re: Contempt, and Judgment, T[2C, Record Page
5, Addendum No. 3).
3.

Hockey Game. On November 20, 1999, Petitioner took the

child StephaniefromRespondent's custody at a hockey game. It was undisputed that this
was Respondent's weekend with the children and she approached and convinced the child
to go with her without having any conversation with Respondent and without notifying
him. At the hearing, Respondent testified to his upset at finding the child missing and that
he called the police. Again, Petitioner's only explanation was that the child herself wanted
to go with her after the hockey game and she admits not discussing it with Respondent.
The Decree of Divorce is clear that the children do not decide what visitation to have with
their parents, but that the minimum schedule is the standard and this represents a clear
violation of Respondent's visitation time which again was compounded by Petitioner's
subterfuge in sneaking the child away without notice.
(4)

Removing the children from school December 21 and 22. 1999. It

was undisputed that Petitioner removed the children from school on these two dates
without Respondent's consent or notice to him. Again, testimony at the time of hearing
was that she relied on one of the children who expressed a desire to miss school and go on
vacation in Arizona. In this instance, Petitioner had even been made aware of a letter
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from Respondent's counsel that he did not want the children to miss any school (copy of
letter Exhibit A to Addendum No. 6). The Court found the Petitioner again to be in
violation of both the letter and the spirit of the Decree which was in force at the time.
(5)

Refusal to allow visitation with Stephanie, December 7. 1999 -

December 24,1999. Although this episode is referred to in Petitioner's brief, this does not
represent one of the episodes on which the Court made a finding of contempt in its Order
entered March 22,2000 and will thus not be discussed herein.
Certain information concerning the contempt issues was omitted from
Petitioner's brief and helps to explain the degree of her contemptuous behavior in this
case. For example, the Court found that the Petitioner encouraged Stephanie, age 8, to
prepare an affidavit against her father. This was done without notice to or knowledge of
the Guardian ad Litem, the child's attorney. In the Order on Contempt, the trial court also
references the Petitioner's violations of the "intent and spirit of Decree, openly and
flagrantly interfering with Respondent's visitation and parental rights [stating that] her
conduct cannot be justified." The trial court found that Petitioner called the police in the
presence of the eight-year old child, thus thrusting her into the dispute. That there had
been a pattern of Petitioner refusing to communicate with Respondent, ignoring his calls
and refusing to allow Respondent's mother to pick up the child when he was working.
(Order in Re: Contempt and Judgment, Record Page 4-8, Addendum No. 3). A review of
the record thus reveals substantial and convincing evidence to support the trial court's
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findings on all the episodes of contempt referenced in the Order in Re: Contempt and
Judgment. Taking the record and facts in this case as a whole, there was no abuse of
discretion and the Court's findings on contempt should be affirmed.
D.

Was the failure to personally serve the OSC a fatal defect?

Petitioner asserts that the Respondent's filing of the contempt motion in this
case was defective because the OSC and motion were not served together as provided by
Rule 6(d). Clearly, the purpose of the service rule is to provide a party with appropriate
notice. Both attorney Jackson and Petitioner were present on February 25,2000 for the
contempt hearing. Petitioner scheduled that date for hearing on her Motion for a New
Trial and Respondent scheduled that date for hearing on contempt pursuant to the
certification made by the Commissioner after two previous hearings. Petitioner was clearly
prepared to go forward with the evidentiary hearing on contempt on that date and had
brought tapes to present to the Court as well as two independent witnesses. It is thus
apparent that Petitioner was not surprised or prejudiced in any way by the evidentiary
hearing and had proper notice and opportunity to present her complete case to the Court
and no procedural rights were abrogated in this matter.
E.

Was a clear order in place which was violated by the Petitioner's
1999 Halloween visitation contempt?

The Halloween contempt violation occurred the weekend of October 30
and 31,1999, which was after the divorce trial, but before entry of the Decree of Divorce
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November 19, 1999. Based on this timing, Petitioner alleges she was uninformed of the
Court Order. This is nonsense. All parties were present during the two-day bench trial and
were informed from the bench during the trial concerning the custody and visitation orders.
(Transcript, page 238 through 251). In fact the ruling on custody that the Court would not
change the temporary arrangement of split custody was made from the bench at the close
of evidence on the first day of trial August 19,1999. As there was to be no change in the
temporary order, which was clearly stated by the trial court, it is certainly disingenuous for
the Petitioner to assert that on Halloween 1999, she was uninformed of what the visitation
order contained. Indeed, there was even more direct notification of the content of the final
orders before Halloween, that is, Respondent's counsel mailed to Petitioner's counsel, the
draft orders October 25,1999. Again, Petitioner's counsel is making an argument of form
over substance and ignoring the reality of the situation, the clear knowledge of the parties
and common logic.
F.

Was there acquiescence in the contemptuous conduct by the
complaining party?

Petitioner asserts that she should be relieved from any finding of contempt
concerning the Halloween 1999 episode, taking the children from school for their Arizona
vacation for Christmas 1999, and the computer incident because the Respondent
"acquiesced" in these actions. This is absolutely false and contradicted clearly on the
record in this case. Petitioner makes a fundamental error in asserting that the "Decree of
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Divorce allows the terms of the visitation to be set by the children, not the parents."
Reviewing the transcript of the February 25,2000 evidentiary hearing on contempt shows
indeed that Respondent did not acquiesce in the contempt. At page 56 of the Transcript,
he states his understanding of the visitation schedule which is alternate weekends, from
Friday night until Sunday evening. He testified to his frustration that he could not
communicate directly with Petitioner because she would never answer the phone and did
not have an answering machine. (Transcript Page 56). When Petitioner testified about the
visitation, she was questioned as to whether she recollected being before Commissioner
Jones on three different occasions when she was admonished not to let her eight-year old
daughter decide whether she was going to visit or not. Her response was that she did not
know. (Transcript 99,100). It was clear in Petitioner's testimony that she made no effort
to discuss the Halloween issue with Respondent, rather she asserted that it was the child's
choice. (Transcript Page 100,101). As to the computer issue, Petitioner testified that the
child wanted it and began carrying it out of the house. She told the child her father would
"be upset" and because there were many parts to the computer, and then asked the older
child Brady to help carry it out. (Transcript 103, 104). Essentially, Petitioner states she
was a passive participant in the eight-year old child deciding to take a computer out of the
home and then admits her complicity by asking the older child Brady to help her. She
equated the computer with things the children frequently take between the home such as
"shoes and games." (Transcript page 106) Petitioner testified about the days missed from
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school for the Arizona vacation, stating that the children told her that Respondent was
"fine with if, but admitted she did not call to discuss it with him. (Transcript 110). It is
also clear that Petitioner knew in advance that Respondent objected to having the children
miss school for their vacation (Transcript 111). Petitioner admitted that when she picked
up the children for the driving trip to Arizona Tuesday night, she went to Respondent's
home in violation of the restraining order (Transcript 112,113). Petitioner admitted that
on Monday she received a letterfromher attorney with a letterfromRespondent's attorney
stating that the children "absolutely were not to go" and he objected to them missing
school (Transcript 113,114).
The above-referenced testimony does not show any acquiescence in
Petitioner's contempt by Respondent. Rather, he was an unwilling victim of her unilateral
acts which she tries to justify by stating the children motivated her. Even when attorneys
are involved in corresponding and discussing the exact terms of the visitation orders,
Petitioner stillfindsan excuse to justify her conduct. The trial court rightfully found this
to be contemptuous and under no circumstances can these facts be construed as
Respondent's acquiescing in the contemptuous conduct. Importantly, by the time of the
December Arizona vacation, Respondent had alreadyfiledhis first Order to Show Cause,
which was issued November 18,1999 seeking sanctions for contempt. What more clear
statement can there be that a party is not acquiescing in contemptuous conduct?
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE EVIDENCE AS
TO MR. MILLER'S INCOME AND NO "ADVERSE INFERENCE"
SHOULD BE DRAWN FROM THE EVIDENCE OR LACK THEREOF

The Petitioner asserts the Court of Appeals should apply an "adverse inference rule"
and make speculative findings about his income because Mr. Miller had not filed personal
tax returns or the type of specific financial record that Petitioner was seeking. Despite the
lengthy legal citations in this portion of Petitioner's brief, there is no Utah authority that
this rule applies or that it applies to divorce cases. Petitioner's authority is primarily from
the Tax Code and in fact, no domestic cases are referenced. This is understandable as
domestic trials involve people from all walks of life, a relatively small portion being
financially sophisticated and the majority are simple people making a modest living. To
apply an adverse inference to every individual who failed to file a tax return would create
an unworkable standard. Such a rule would result in trial courts making estimates and
guesses of income, rather than analyzing the evidence actually available. The trial court
in this case had substantial evidence on the incomes of the parties through both testimony
and documentation and its findings should be respected and upheld by this Court.
Interestingly, when Petitioner argued the adverse inference rule in closing argument, the
trial court replied that the condition of failing to file income taxes in this case appeared to
be a longstanding situation in the marriage and was not solely Respondent's problem or
responsibility.
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The trial court had sufficient evidence and testimony from which to make findings
in the area of Respondent's income. Respondent presented a year-to-date, profit and loss
statement for 1999 (Respondent's exhibit 63). Exhibit 61 was a summary prepared by Mr.
Miller of his business organizations where each trust and assets of each trust were listed
and valued. Respondent's Financial Declaration and testimony was consistent with his
court filings that he earned from $ 1,800 to $2,000 per month. (Transcript 173). There was
no evidence that the lifestyle of the parties was anything other than modest and the parties
did not take vacations other than to visit relatives (Transcript page 174). The parties did
not buy new cars during their 15-year marriage. (Transcript page 174). Mr. Miller
testified at length as to the type and vintage of his equipment, none of which was newer
than 1995 and all of which had been repaired or needed repairs (Transcript 189 - 195).
Mr. Miller testified to his business income from a year-to-date computer summary. He
thoroughly reviewed his business expenses which include fuel, maintenance and operating
costs as well as hiring subcontractors and office overhead expenses. Respondent testified
concerning his financial declaration and a pro forma tax return to estimate his gross
income at approximately $2,000 and his net after taxes of $1,486. (Transcript 221-223;
Respondent's exhibit 66, 67). It is clear that the Court weighed the evidence in this case
and tried to make an equitable ruling and the ruling did not simply reflect what one or the
other parties wanted. Petitioner testified that Respondent's income should be $5,000 per
month, Respondent testified it was $2,000 a month and the Court ruled it was $2,500 per
month.
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Petitioner makes no attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
finding that Respondent earned $2,500 per month, instead, she creates a laundry list of
allegations which were unproven at trial and unpersuasive to the trial court. This Court
should give great deference to the trial court's findings of fact on Respondent's income
and should not overturn such findings unless they are "clearly erroneous". Kessimakis v.
Kessimakis, 1999 UT App 977 P.2d 1226, Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 1987 UT 745 P.2d
1276,1277. This Court has explained that a finding can be deemed clearly erroneous if
it violates the standard set by the Appellate Court, as against the clear weight of the
evidence. Cummings v. Cummings, 1991 UT App 821 P.2d 472.
A major flaw in Petitioner's attack on the trial court's finding of income is that
Petitioner had no better evidence to present to the Court. Petitioner makes allegations and
innuendo of higher income, but has no credible evidence. For example, Petitioner states
that there are direct payments of Mr. Miller's personal expenses by the business
(Appellant's Brief, Item H, page 35). Mr. Miller denied this and explained when he lives
on business property he adds the value of rent and utilities to his personal income.
(Transcript Page 258). The transcript reference Petitioner gives at page 266 reflects that
Mr. Miller admits he took a draw of $200 cash when he went to Alaska to pay for food and
that he had his business pay $436 for medical expenses for his children, but has listed that
in the business profit and loss statement. (Transcript Page 266) Petitioner thus makes a
generalization about the business paying personal expenses which falls apart under
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scrutiny. Another innuendo Petitioner makes is to assert that the trusts were created for
Respondent's benefit. (Appellant's Brief, Item F and G page 35). Respondent credibly
testified that he set up the business trusts to protect his family because he could not afford
liability insurance. Also, that he replaces and repairs equipment constantly and keeps a
reserve fund in the trust for this purpose. All such activity is reported on the trust summary
exhibits (Transcript, Pages 254, 261 and 267). Another innuendo Petitioner makes is to
state that it is "significant" that Mr. Miller carries $500 in cash in his wallet when he
works. (Appellant Brief, Item M Page 36). Respondent credibly testified that he does this
in case he needs fuel on the job and it costs $100 or more to fill up his equipment and not
all fuel stations take such large checks (Transcript Page 279). In closing argument, the trial
court asked for a dollar figure for Respondent's income. Petitioner's counsel replied that
it was "over $5,000 a month", but it is also clear in the exchange with the Court that this
figure did not consider any business expenses. (Transcript page 317-321).
In short, although Petitioner has made a laundry list of unconnected allegations to
argue Respondent has higher earnings, each allegation was credibly explained. An
exclusive function of the trial court is to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility
of witnesses. The trial court considered the conflicting testimony and evidence and made
appropriate and clear findings. The Petitioner has not shown the income findings to be
clearly erroneous and these should be affirmed.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINES IN THIS CASE.

There is no dispute that the child support guidelines at UCA §78-45-7.2(3) create
a rebuttable presumption and that a calculation pursuant to the appropriate custody
worksheet should be the presumed support amount. In this case, the Court directed a
worksheet be prepared based on Petitioner's earnings of $1,500 gross per month and
Respondent's earnings of $2,500 gross per month. Based on the split custody, the support
amount is $46 per month, gradually increasing over time as the children age off the scale.
Petitioner argues that the Court should have ordered a support based on $5,000 gross per
month as Respondent's income and failing to do so was in error. This argument is without
merit. Petitioner claims as error, the trial court's refusal to include income from Mr.
Miller's premarital properties that were awarded to him in the divorce. This is not error
as once again, Petitioner did not present any evidence of present earnings from these
properties. She presents some historical evidence from the Major Street property that it
generated $450 a month rent. In fact, Mr. Miller testified that the Major Street property
was condemned by the city, was uninhabitable and taxes were owing for several years clearly not an income producing asset. (Record 1370, Transcript Pages 310 and 311). The
only evidence of incomefromthe properties on 200 East was a six-month lease signed in
1991. Again no current evidence was produced and the Respondent testified these were
not occupied. The assertion that the Court should essentially impute rent as income is
unfair and does not consider the present condition of the properties or any costs such as
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mortgage or maintenance. Without better evidence the court would just be guessing and
that is simply an insufficient basis on which the Court could determine income and the trial
court correctly declined to do so. The ruling on child support made by the trial court in
this case is accurate based on the proven incomes at trial and should be affirmed.
IV.

WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO VERIFY THE GROSS
INCOME OF MR. MILLER UNDER THE SUPPORT GUIDELINES?

Petitioner sets forth accurately the requirements in the support guidelines at UCA
§78-45-7.5 to define income for child support purposes and to submit verification in
support of the worksheet calculations. Petitioner makes the inexplicable leap from these
requirements that Respondent in this case must provide income verification to the trial
court in accordance with the guidelines. The guidelines themselves provide that a trial
court should determine present earnings and can make such a determination from historical
earnings record, testimony and other evidence. The court may even impute income if
necessary if such evidence is absent and a hearing is held. There is simply no rule of law
or procedure that without a tax return or particular type of documentary evidence, income
cannot be established. Petitioner's arguments in this regard are without merit.
V.

IT IS IRRELEVANT TO THESE PROCEEDINGS WHETHER THE
CHILDREN WORK FOR RESPONDENT IN A "HAZARDOUS
OCCUPATION WITHOUT CONSENT OF THE STATE".

The Petitioner argues that the minor children of the parties are barred by law from
employment in a hazardous job as heavy equipment operators. This argument is entirely
gratuitous and is irrelevant to these proceedings. No party is claiming that the children's
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incomes should be included in the incomes of either party. Mr. Miller did respond when
asked about this that he taught both his sons to operate heavy equipment and they work on
occasional weekends and sometimes after school and his best estimate is that both children
were paid a total of $500 in 1999 (R. 1370, Transcript 246). Again Petitioner makes an
inference that the income of the children is under the "exclusive control of the
Respondent", but there is no evidence whatsoever that this is the case and the question was
not asked at trial. The amount involved is so minuscule as to have no impact on these
proceedings one way or the other.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ALLOCATIONS OF THE INCOME TAX
EXEMPTION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

The parties were awarded split custody of their children and the trial court ruled that
the tax dependent exemptions should follow the children. Thus, Respondent has two
exemptions and Petitioner has one, but she has the youngest child and will benefit from
that for a longer time. Because of the history of inconsistent tax filings, the Court also
ruled that if a party did not file a tax return or otherwise benefit from the exemption, then
all exemptions should be taken by the other party. This ruling readily meets the balancing
test set forth in UCA §78-45-7.21 which provides there is no presumption as to which
parent should be awarded a tax exemption and certain factors are to be considered.
Petitioner's approach is to award all exemptions to her because Respondent is behind on
child support. There is every reason to expect that Petitioner will become current in
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support over a reasonable period of time and that his delinquency was caused by having
both a support and an alimony order as well as litigation and divorce expenses. A trial
court may include a provision that neither parent may claim the exemption if they are not
current in support payment, but this was not requested at trial and cannot be argued for the
first time on appeal. Under the facts of this case where both parents have children in their
household on a full time basis due to split custody, an equitable allocation of the
exemptions cannot be found to be an abuse of discretion.
VII.

THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT NOT TO AWARD ALIMONY
WAS APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

The factors which a court must consider in awarding alimony are set forth in UC A
§30-3-5(7)(a) (1988) and in this case, the analysis truly stops at that point. One of the
factors is the obligor's ability to pay which the trial court found lacking. This conclusion
is well supported in view of the trial evidence on Petitioner's age, health, employment and
resources. The Court found that the parties' incomes and needs were comparable and that
neither party had the ability to pay alimony to the other.
Additionally, the Court found the temporary award of alimony made by the
Commissioner of $400 per month which had never been paid on by Mr. Miller, to have
been unwarranted. Mr. Miller filed a Motion to Reduce Temporary Support on April 5,
1996 and Commissioner Jones reserved the issue for trial by order entered July 16,1996.
The trial court thus had the authority to vacate that temporary order, which it did. It was
only at trial, that the court received a complete picture of the lifestyle of the parties, which
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was modest and the actual incomes of the parties. Although gross receipts maybe high in
Respondent's business, his operating costs and overhead is enormous and when all is said
and done, he earns an effective rate of $10 to $12 per hour.
VIII. THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY WAS APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED.
Property division is another area where the Courts of Appeal traditionally defer to
a trial court's determination and is an area where this Court has stated that the findings of
the trial court "are entitled to a presumption of validity." Naranjo v. Naranjo, 1988 UT
App751 P.2d 1144,1146. It has also been held that changes will be made in a trial court's
property division "only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error . . . " Watson v. Watson, UT 1992 837 P.2d
1,5.
The allocation of real property in this case is appropriate, fair, and advances the
lives of the parties by ending their entanglements. The marital residence was awarded to
Petitioner with equity of $93,000 free from any claim of Respondent. Respondent was
awarded property located on State Street in Sandy, Utah with an equity of $34,000.
Respondent was also awarded his premarital, separate properties, which although they had
been rented in the past, were not presently rented and one of which was substantially
broken down and uninhabitable with several years of unpaid taxes. The title to the State
Street property was also held by Respondent's mother based on her large investment of
over $50,000 to save it from foreclosure. (R. 1370, Transcript pages 324-325). The trial
Page 35 of 42

court also awarded to Mr. Miller, his business property valued at $76,000 and personal
property to Petitioner of $12,700. In making these rulings, the trial court stated that it
considered the values of Respondent's property to be somewhat "soft", which made the
award balanced. (Record 1370, Transcript pages 350-351). It is also evident that
Respondent is less liquid and is unlikely to sell his business property as he uses it daily to
make a living. Petitioner complains that the award of the State Street property to
Respondent is unfair, but does not explain that allegation nor does she attempt to marshal
the evidence concerning the division of property which would support this allegation.
Based on these circumstances, the division of property should be upheld and affirmed by
this reviewing Court.
IX.

THE ATTORNEY FEE AND COSTS AWARDED TO RESPONDENT AT
TRIAL SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL.

It is well settled that the decision to award attorneys fees and the amount of such
fees are within the trial court's sound discretion. Wilde v. Wilde, 1998 UT App 969 P.2d.
438, 444.
A.
appeal.

The attorney fee award to Respondent should not be disturbed on

In order to support an award of fees, the trial court must find first "that the

requesting party is in need of financial assistance; second, the requested fees are
reasonable; and third, the other spouse has the ability to pay." Muir v. Muir, 1992 UT App
841P.2d.736,741.
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The Petitioner's counsel filed an affidavit of attorneys fees requesting the
sum of $7,524.25. The trial court stated that both parties had a comparable ability to pay
their fees but awarded Petitioner the sum of $4,000. The Court stated that the award was
equitable due to the fact that Petitioner's attorney withdrew shortly before trial and it is
evident that trial counsel had short notice to prepare for trial which likely duplicated efforts
of prior counsel, making her fees higher. The Court also explained he did not believe a
full award to Petitioner was justified based on the numerous and frivolous claims set forth
in her amended complaint as to the peculiar business entities and fraud which were all
unfounded. These claims needlessly complicated the case and caused excessive fees on
both sides. (Record 1370, Transcript pages 340-341 and 352-353). It is evident that the
award of fees herein was reasonable and supported by a clearly stated basis for reduced
fees which should be affirmed on appeal.
B.

The cost award should not be disturbed on appeal. The trial court

declined to award costs in this matter. This is entirely in the discretion of the trial court
and was denied presumably for the same reason that the full fee award was not given. That
is, the Court found that the expenses and incomes of both parties were "comparable" and
did not find that Respondent had any greater ability than Petitioner to pay her fees and
costs

Page 37 of 42

X.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE INTEREST ON CHILD
SUPPORT IN THIS CASE.

The trial court awarded child support arrearages based on the stipulation of the
parties in the amount of $8,483.36 (Record page 37,41). (R. 1370, Transcript pages 296,
297). The Petitioner's exhibit requested interest compounded monthly which was
inappropriate, which was the finding of the trial court. (R. 1371, Transcript page 24). The
question of interest was thus not in dispute before the trial court and cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.
XL

PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT SPECIFIC JUDGMENT DEBTOR
INFORMATION WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE DECREE IS MOOT.

Petitioner's complaint that she did not have her husband's social security number
was again raised at the hearing held February 25,2000 on Contempt and Motion for New
Trial and the parties stipulated to provide that information. (R. 1371, Transcript page 24)
This issue is therefore moot.
XII.

THE PETITIONER FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE WHICH
IS FATAL TO THE APPEAL AND RESPONDENT SHOULD BE
AWARDED HIS FEES ON APPEAL.

This Court has stated on many occasions that a critical requirement of appellate
advocacy is the duty of the Appellant to marshal the evidence when challenging the trial
court's findings of fact. Petitioner herein made no effort to marshal the evidence in this
case. Based on Petitioner's complete failure to marshal any evidence, Respondent should
be awarded his fees on appeal.
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The marshaling requirement has been defined and explained in numerous domestic
cases. In the recent case of Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 973 P.2d 431, the Court found
on appeal that Mr. Moon had simply reargued his own evidence and because he failed to
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, the Appellate Court had to
assume that the record supported the findings of the trial court. This Court has also held
that when a party challenges findings on appeal and fails to marshal the supporting
evidence, that the trial court's findings will not be disturbed on appeal. Rudman v.
Rudman, 1991 UT App 812 P.2d 73, 79. See also Breinholt v. Breinholt, 1995 UT App
905 P.2d 877, 882. The marshaling rule was adopted to insure that the Appellate Court
would not be put in the position of retrying the case without seeing or hearing the
witnesses. Nilson v. Nilson, 1982 UT 652 P.2d 1323,1324. Given the failure of Petitioner
to marshal any evidence whatsoever, it is inconceivable that she should succeed on appeal.
On this basis, Respondent respectfully moves this Court for an award of attorneys fees and
costs incurred in the appeal, either under Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure or as to the party prevailing on the appeal pursuant to Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000
UT App 47.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly resolved the conflicting testimony and evidence in this case
and followed controlling law in its rulings. The Petitioner completely failed to marshal
any evidence in support of the appeal and this reviewing court should thus presume all trial
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court findings to be appropriate. Additionally, this Court should award Respondent her
attorneys fees and costs on appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the findings and the ruling made
by the trial court in this divorce case and deny the appeal.
Respectfully submitted this

m

3Q day of October, 2000.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

i^i^c

James H. Woodall
Suzanne Marelius
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellees
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
(801) 531-0435; Fax: 575-7823
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; November 19,1999.

3.

Order in Re: Contempt and Judgment; February 23, 2000.

4.

Recommendation, Order and Judgment; December 23,1999.

5.

(Verified) Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for Order to
Show Cause; Order to Show Cause; December 28,1999.

6.
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November 18,1999.
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ADDENDUM
NO. 1

r-v-•--••••
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*
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JAMES H. WOODALL (:53 61)
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for respondent
42 6 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Te] ephone : 1 a m ) si 1 - n 4 1 s
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OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
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Petitioner,
vs .
LAIi'h'Y T ,

Ml liliRP

)
)
)
)
)
)

M i l ,

Respondents.
*

TIML";

rnia t; f" f»i' ."vnih"-

*

1 'as»
Judge

I!

n Im

representee
resentec .

David

S.

Younq

"

I 1 1,1 I IieLurv

Udvia S. Young on August 19 and 20, 1999,
d: :: represented L*

Hi

--v:n !a*--sor..

III'.*

Honorable

Petitioner was present

~°^rond^- - vri ' ^resent and

'*•*

: ^ -.'la..,..

I.J^.A.

!;, and

.:u: \ \ Weston had previously

appeared c: iehalf of the Trusfc~;~ rr.a" ha"° h^e~ r.ar.ei a°
defendants - -

-

d:^ed:ia *.:...

• :.:e: part.-3 made appearances.

The Court heard the te-T. : rr,c:r.
witnesses, -eceived
proffers of counsel

i

i

"" th-=* parties -,: " -heir
-

.:.d

G :)od cause appearing, and the Court tiaving
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previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
the Court enters the following DECREE OF DIVORCE:
1.

Petitioner ("Tracy") is hereby awarded a decree of

divorce from respondent ("Larry") on grounds of irreconcilable
differences.
2.

The parties are awarded joint legal custody of-

their minor children, Jeron L. Miller, born December 1, 1983,
Brady L. Miller, born June 25, 1985, and Stephanie Miller, born
July 10, 1991. Primary physical custody of Jeron and Brady shall
be with Larry, and primary physical custody of Stephanie shall be
with Tracy.
3.

Each parent shall be entitled to exercise

visitation with the children as the parties and the children are
able to agree, but no event less frequently than as set forth at
§ 30-3-35, Utah Code Ann. The children are to be given leeway to
determine the amount of time they spend with either parent, and
with which parent they reside, and the parties are to respect the
children's desires.
4.

Joint legal custody, as used herein, shall mean

the sharing of rights, duties and responsibilities as parents by
both parties.

Each parent shall have the authority to make

routine decisions regarding the children's day-to-day activities,
but each shall be required to consult with the other and seek his
or her opinion on all nonroutine matters, such as medical and
educational decisions involving the children.
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5.

Both parties shall be listed as the persons to be

notified by school authorities in the event of an emergency
involving the children.
6.

Each parent is ordered to notify the other and

provide him or her with schedules of the children's
extracurricular activities.

Neither parent shall be required to

pay for or take the children to any activities which he or she
has not agreed to, but both may attend and participate in all
practices, games, and school activities to which parents are
invited without regard to the visitation schedule.

The parties

shall both use their best efforts to encourage the children to
improve their performance at school.
7.

Both parents shall have full access to all of the

children's teachers and health care providers, as well as their
schools and medical records, with no requirement to notify the
other or obtain his or her permission.
8.

Both parties shall immediately notify the other of

all nonroutine or emergency medical, educational, or legal events
involving the children that occur when they are in his or her
custody, in particular any event that requires a child to be
treated at any medical facility for any reason.
9.

Both parties shall be entitled to reasonable

telephone contact with the children, which shall be unmonitored,
and both shall the children to telephone the other party whenever
they desire.
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10.

Both parties shall keep each other informed of his

or her address and telephone number at all times.
11.

Both parties shall notify the other whenever he or

she intends to take the children on any overnight trip exceeding
two nights, and provide the other with a travel itinerary with
addresses and telephone numbers where he or she may be reached in
the event of an emergency.
12.

The parties shall use their best efforts to foster

and encourage a positive relationship between the children and
the other parent.

Both parties are hereby restrained from

disparaging or demeaning the other in the presence of the
children, allowing any third party to do so, or doing anything
that is intended to or would reasonably be expected to adversely
affect the other party's relationship with the children.
13.

Based on the split physical custody arrangement,

Tracy is ordered to pay Larry $46 per month as child support, but
such amount shall be applied to Larry's child support arrearages.
Accordingly, Tracy shall pay no child support until Larry's
arrearages have been satisfied.
14.

When Jeron attains the age of eighteen years or

graduates from high school with his class, whichever comes last,
Larry shall begin paying Tracy $113 per month as child support
immediately.

Such payments shall continue until Brady attains

the age of eighteen years or graduates from high school with his
class, whichever comes last, at which time Larry shall pay Tracy
i3

™*

\ [ \S

$2 93 per month as child support until Stephanie attains the age
of eighteen years or graduates from high school with her class,
unless sooner modified by the Court.
15.

Larry shall be entitled to claim Jeron and Brady

as dependents on his income tax returns, provided he in fact
files his tax returns and the deductions benefit him.

Tracy

shall be entitled to claim Stephanie as a dependent on her income
tax returns, provided she in fact files her tax returns and the
deductions benefit her.

Should either party fail to file income

tax returns by May 1 of each calendar year, or benefit from the
deduction, the other party shall be entitled to claim all three
children as dependents.
16.

The parties shall maintain health insurance for

the children's benefit if such coverage becomes available at a
reasonable cost.
17.

Each party shall pay one-half of the work related

day care expenses, uninsured medical expenses, and health
insurance premiums that are incurred on behalf of the children.
18.

Each party shall notify the other promptly of all

reimbursable expenses he or she incurs on behalf of the children,
and in no event later than thirty days after such expenses are
incurred.

Upon receipt of documentation that such expenses have

been incurred, each party shall pay his share to the other party
within ten days of receipt of such documentation.

Should either

party fail to provide documentation of such expenses within

-Q_
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thirty days of incurring them, his or her right to reimbursement
shall be waived.
19.

Larry is awarded as his sole and exclusive

property the property located at 8689 South State Street, Sandy,
Utah, is $100,000, subject to all outstanding indebtedness and
holding Tracy harmless thereon.

Tracy is ordered to execute a

quitclaim deed, conveying her interest in this property to Larry,
upon the entry of this Decree of Divorce.
20.

Tracy is awarded as her sole and exclusive

property the property located at 13520 South 2160 West, Riverton,
Utah, subject to all outstanding indebtedness and holding Larry
harmless thereon.

Larry is ordered to execute a quitclaim deed,

conveying his interest in this property to Tracy, upon the entry
of this Decree of Divorce.
21.

Larry shall retain as his premarital separate

property the residences at 1592 South Major Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah, and 3153 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, free
of any claim by Tracy.
22.

Tracy is awarded as her sole and exclusive

property the household furnishings, fixtures, and appliances in
the Riverton home, except for the blue mirror and the Kubota
tiller, which she shall surrender to Larry, or allow him to pick
up, by September 20, 1999.

Should Larry fail to pick up these

items by that time, they shall be deemed abandoned.
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23.

Tracy is awarded as her sole and exclusive

property the 1988 Dodge Colt automobile, which is valued at $800,
and all of the salon equipment which is currently in Larry's
possession.

Tracy shall retrieve her salon equipment by

September 20, 1999, or such items will be deemed abandoned.
24.

Larry is awarded all of the business equipment,

whether held in his name or in the name of any corporation or
trust, all of the parties' right, title and interest in LTM, Inc,
a Utah Corporation, and all of the trusts he has formed during
the parties' marriage, including all tangible and intangible
property, fixtures, equipment, inventory, accounts, accounts
receivable, and goodwill.

Larry is ordered to indemnify and hold

Tracy harmless from and against all debts, obligations, and
liabilities associated with his business, whether now known or
hereafter discovered, including all obligations to federal and
state taxing authorities.
25.

Except as otherwise set forth herein, each party

is awarded the personal property presently in his or her
possession, free of any claims of the other.
26.

As set forth above, Tracy is ordered to assume and

satisfy all obligations associated with the Riverton property,
and Larry is ordered to assume and satisfy obligations associated
with the Sandy property, as well as those associated with his
business.
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27.

The parties shall each be responsible for one-half

of the debts owing to the Grace Lutheran Church in the
approximate amount of $8,380, and to Allied Collection in the
approximate amount of $1,187.
28.

Each party shall assume and satisfy all remaining

obligations that are in his or her name, holding the other
harmless thereon, including any obligations that are assessed
against the parties by state or federal taxing authorities.
29.

Having found that Larry is delinquent in his prior

child support payments in the amount of $8,483.36, judgment shall
enter against him in this amount.
30.

Having found that alimony is not warranted in this

case, now or ever, that the parties' incomes and needs are
comparable, and that neither party has the ability to pay alimony
to the other, no alimony is awarded.

The temporary alimony order

is hereby vacated.
31.

Each party shall be awarded all such accounts that

are in his or her name, free of any claim of the other.
32.

Larry is ordered to pay $4,000 of Mr. Jackson's

fees, and judgment shall enter against Larry in this amount.

All

other fees shall be the sole responsibility of the party who
incurred them.
33.

The parties are ordered to cooperate with each

other, and to cause any corporation or trust to cooperate in
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executing the appropriate documents to carry out the terms of
this decree.
34.

Tracy has no residual interest in any trusts that

have been the subject of this litigation.

This action is hereby

dismissed as to the trusts, Robin Larson, and Lawrence Jacobsen,
with prejudice.
35.
merit.

Tracy's claims against Ms. Miller are without

Such action is dismissed, with prejudice.
DATED this

% £ c l a y of ^Afii**<srb^^

1999.
^".c

BY THE CQBRJSc*

v&.h

DISTRICTvC

Approved as to form:

Attorneys for
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to the following on October 25, 1999:
W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB 8c JACKSON
311 South State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Franklin L. Slaugh
880 East 9400 South, Suite 103
Sandy, Utah 84094
Gary A. Weston
NIELSEN Sc SENIOR
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM
NO. 2

JAMES H. WOODALL (5361)
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for respondent
426 South 500 East^
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
*

•

•

TRACY L. MILLER,

•

*

•

)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

LARRY T. MILLER, et al,
Respondents.

)

Case No. 95-4901732 DA

)

Judge David S. Young

* * * * *

This matter came on for trial before the Honorable
David S. Young on August 19 and 20, 1999.
and represented by W. Kevin Jackson.
represented by James H. Woodall.
represented by Franklin L. Slaugh.

Petitioner was present

Respondent was present and

Bonnie Miller was present and
Gary A. Weston had previously

appeared on behalf of the Trusts that have been named as
defendants but, by agreement of the parties, neither he nor the
Trusts appeared at trial.

No other parties made appearances.

The Court heard the testimony of the parties and their
witnesses, received evidence, and considered the arguments and
proffers of counsel.

Good cause appearing, the Court enters the

following FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

000044

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

F--

Utah, and has -esided _

-\:.

: -ike County, 'Jr.an :or more thai

three months prior to the commencement of this si lit.
2 .

P e t :i t: i • D i ie i: (" ! i a c;;,, ") a nd r e s p o ridc

• ~e

wife and husband, having been married in Teton County , Wyomi..g on
October 10, 1381.
The par t::i e, 3 ha - e i ri econci labl e • :::! i f f eren ::es w I: :i i ch

3.

prevent the continuation of their marriage

It: :ii s reasonable and

appropriate that Tracy be granted a decree of divorce on such
grounds.
4.

Three children were borr. :- ' ssue
,,,

:!l(?r

rrarriace,. Jercr
N . . .v

L -::. i

,.

born December

1

f

: th*~ parties'

*Q~m< B r a - "

. ai n I Stepl: l ...

19 91.
5.

'

oarties have attended the parenting class.

CHILD CUSTODY , VI g I T A T I Q N ^ pj^
6.

S U

PPQRT

The Court finds that it is I n the best interests

of the children that the parties shal 1 be awarded their ^ i n *
legal custody.

1- i: ii nar > pi: i> sical custody * ::>f > 3 ei: c i l

- .

be with Larry, and primary physical custody of Stephanie sha . rwith Tracy.
;

"I '1 ie Court bases this decision on the evidence

adduced at trial that the boys, who were fifteen and fourteen
years : :»] d at: the • t, i m e c f 1 : i : i 1

1i<

s

n < -1 at, i o n s h i i M I I In

their mother and refuse to live with 1 lei

The O. a n

wdb

particularly impressed with Tracy's admission that violence could
res nil I M! the I" • >/.;.' were h m T P d
will.

fn live with her against

The Court: believes that the boys iiave a stronger

their father than with their mother.
thd'i1, Lhunjs h-:r"

then

bond 'A

While it is unfortunate

"'"'mi'" lo Miri, \ h*-* Pourt- finds no evidence that

Larry i s to blame for the breakdown in

the relationship' betweei 1

Tracy and the boys.
8.

i»t'

'

•

- - -:•

not performing *.\el - :n sjncol, tut the >_^r

a^.t. n^t

a^c

L-.^eve

that forcing th-m - ^ '.iv^ *. • - "Yary will improve the situa"

n.

1 1 le C Din: !::: i s :i r i: ipr esse :i :i t l i ti i, =

• : t:s I .ar i: y has i indertaken to

encourage their academic improvement.

Theitr is :.w credible

evidence that Tracy could do a better job.
that Larry ha^
9.

i <•", *•>«i app t up Lie:

t

The ;"ourt believes

, .

•*t- n i r < A , q .

Each parent shall oe entitled to exercise

visitation with the children as the parties and the children are
a

bJ' j I't dyiee, ln.il ui',) <:"•' -.'ill |H\S;;I 1.1 equenl I \ " lli.in -is s^f

§ 30-3-35, Utah Code A n n ,

fnrt'i at

T h e c h i l d r e n are to be g i v e n ieewci/

m

det^^^ : r>- t h e "-mount: of t i m e t h e y s p e n d w i t h e i t h e r p a r e n t , a n d
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.- p~ai :it t, h^) " Ji'iiside, .-i11<i the part les an »" t ) i: espect tl le

children's desires.
10.

uom*~ leo?«1 r-^^c~- ~ n~r

tile sharing of Her:.;
both p a r t i e s .

,:.

^g usee here" *~ shal 1 me
-..,..

.

.

_

/

Each parent shall have the authority r-; -take

• (ii mi i. if,:;

in n

reqarding the children's day-to-day act i \ i': »--.3,

routine decisis

but each shall he requir-

\e m oer ar • seek his

or. '16 r opinion en all nonrcurmt- ;narteri.

r

ecu dad

educational d^ ./L VIS involving the children,
T

11,

«ith parties o

- ed as " •-i persons to be

no* i f i ed by school authorities in : nt c.-./..
involving * '

v ..

11
]III

• '"*-*vqency

n M f1 the other and provide

-i . parent ayie.eo '

• h m with schedules of the children'^ eV. » i \
IJ1

activities.
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the children tc any activities win

'•

t")i i"'th may aVeri and participate m
school activj

.

IOL*

r: tak-"

" ;he has not agreed to,
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-

u.

Darents are inm*e." without regara

the visitation schedult

-m

r ^;

~:e "heir rest

•. \
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n

improve rm . : . -

--

at
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other or obtain his .v
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of

educational, or legal events
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IS

B<"th parties shall be unLiLlt-il I

^asonable

-rnone contact with the children, which shall he unmonit cr-"l „
and both shall in^ 'In I li"ii to telephone the other party whenever
they desire.
r

1-"

^th parties shall keep each other informed

or her address . i • J 11 I "' 1 Mph» oif number at all times,
IV

both parties shall not±l> Lik. ^f 1L>. i

-

r-r 01

sh^ uniPRds to take the children on any overnight t- . K. exceeding
two nights, and rti w x ie I 1./ - t !>o w i •: h a travel : - inerary with
- •" • i ±ii

addresses and telephone numbers where he or r
t h*- *j,'Hri' :; £ ar, emergency.
1

.

* ^r ijesi effort- :. foster

and encourage a positive relationship cetween t;.*

r :r

^ F ' ^ i n i r ^ ; order shall ericer whicn strictly

l-r-rn^.u ;

:

th- presence or

l

demeaning tne ct:: :

:v-- rn;idrer M a ..owing c^^

v-—-:--? * -3"

...

,

-.
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expected to adverse.-

I<-I |i.-u-ty's relationship with

the children.
ly.

Tracy is employed as a cosmetologist.

self-employed excaval o i:

Larry is a

Tl r • i i jay' . -nnf 1 ict u;vi test imony

regarding the parties' incomes.

Larry tesciried t I" •-

earned a^ much as he did during the marriage?,

liracy believed-

that Larry earned substantially im M V , Ion ,':h»-' relied in large
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part on L a r r y ' s b u s i n e s s r e c e i p t s , w h i c h did not c o n s i d e r h i s
I i,t" }\i" i no pxpenses .
2u
*-,»di.bl-

Tiic Court finds that I iai: i: j s t: *stii i: ic i i} / a s r i : :i : = •

'rased e n -.he t e s t i m c n v or t h ^ e a r t : e s
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- i muiiti

—,—

support g u i d e l i n e s , iui D U J : . amount oaa, , be appl . . . :
child support a r r e a r a g e s .

- r

'-.ua

„ri;

s

A c c o r d i n g l y , Tracy shall p a y no ch 1 1 d

si ippor t untd 1 1 «arr > s ar rear ages ha v e been sati sfi ed.
23

W h e n J eron attains the age of e i g h t e e n y e a r s o ^

g r a d u a t e s from, h i g h school with his c l a s s , w h i c h e v e r comes las* ,
I s i i: J s ha 1 ] !:: e g i n p a ;;;i! i i ig T" :i : a ::::;;,, $ 1 ] 3 p e i: i: i: t ::: i 111: i a s :::: 1: :i :i -I! I s up *
immediately.

Such p a y m e n t s shall continue until B r a d y attain..

t""he age of eighteen years or Graduates from high school A m\ .\ .-

$2 93 per month as child support untij. S i e p h a m e a t t a i n s t .e a g e
of e i g h t e e n y e a r s or g r a d u a t e s from high school w i t h h e r c l a s s ,
unless sooi ier i i i Ddi f ie :3 1: ;y t: 1: Ie Cc ui: t.
24.

Larry shall be entitled to claim J e r o n and B r a d y

as d e p e n d e n t s o n his' income tax r e t u r n s , p r o v i d e d h e in fact

files his tax returns and the deductions benefit him..
shall be entiLied c

-'-^^ ctephanie as a dependen*

Tracy
her . ncome

tax returns, provid- v.
deductions benefit her,
tax r^turr-

v

;

'

deduction, *:.. c

Should either party ::-. 1 L : riitr _;c:>°r'^ calendar year. * ^ benefit from the

.

-

a] 1 1 .1 i < •

children as ;-cer.dents .
- -s -- : ^ - sv. -; 11 maintain, he a 11 h insurance for
the children . i>-r;eiii

-.

coverage b^i/uiue'i

i

reasonable ccs:.
- 'x
day care expenses

• ' one-half of th^ work related

.i^.^uicJ ;\^a:c_i expenses, and health

insurance premiums that are incurred on behalf ^f th- children
oromptlv ' *

- *
reimbursable expenses . .*. ,. ^..^
and .

\J e\-

* ^at-r "hi

*

•

JiAc^i~

wi. ue;:a_, :

. . .„

. ..

*".\:rf. days after s .~h expenses are
.„__«.-. ^ . r thatfaLichexrenser ^ v ^

been incurred, each party sr:a,_i ra> n u share t-viinir. * en days of receipt of £-urh dccumentati:
- r ^"

-

- "-

inirty days

- * * .*

A\cuLd eitn^r

* suun expenses within

.r.cuiri;^ Lt*<^:.; ...s .r r:er rign:

^ reimbursement

shall be waived.
REAL PROPERTY
28

The Court finds that the value . : i;;e property

located at 8689 South State Street, Sandy, Uta:
AAAAK H

,

that i t is subject to contract indebtedness of $ 6 6 , 0 0 0 , l e a v i n g
:; :)f $34 0(3(3

Th :i s p r o p e r t y shall be a w a r d e d to L a r r y ,

subject to ail 1 o u t s t a n d i n g indebtedness and holdi rig I racy
h a r m l e s s thereoi i

rracy shall be ordered to e x e c u t e a q u i t c l a i m

ji-'-i-d , ' :on v e y i i lg 1 ie: : :i i i t e r e s t :i i i th :i s property to Larry, upon the
entry of a Decree of Divorce.
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The Court finds that the val ^
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and that it is subjeci i
Ieav:n equi^

~^f $93 , CC0

T h ^ property snal

.-::

deed, conveying \:
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- -3-i.

/

e awarded : )
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•-' ' •=• ^

harmless there

•Mil I \

properc /
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n u i ^ * .idebtedness

subj tj

'. . -.

II" i

.: zhe

i. ,.

.

rdered i

e\~

^ L ^ C* ^u-t j. a^-n

mteres*" *~ Lr*is property to Tracy, upon the

il L >
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Larry snail retain as his p r e m a r i t a l

p r o p e r t y t h e r e s i d e n c e s at

separate

1592 South Manor S t r e e t , Salt

Lake

City, ! It ah, and 3163 Si: it I' ,MKi KatU , i:ld LI L ike <"'il.y, IN «t
of a n y c l a i m b y T r a c y

The Court does not find that T r a c y m a d e

any s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s to these p r o p e r t i e s , e i t h e r j n
t: :3 l:1:

"

ie. e f f o r t

e x p e n s e ', i li ir :i i ig Li le n lar r iage

C" oi iseqi lentil ;;

these properties are to be regarded as Larry's separate,
premarital assets.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
31.

The Court finds that the vali le of the household

furnishings, fixtures, and appliances in the Riverton home is

c-

*-

" r -i -v sr. i . I"'- a w a r d e d "i.

:: t:hese : ' e m s e x c e p t f o r t:i le

'• -

t
Larry
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• L -- ^ , .
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detitlltj' J
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September

Should

.terns : y -ha*: ** ir.t

t-;f_ shall be

1 Li i ill 1 i1 Jilr-

32.

Tracy shall be awarded as her sole ai id exclusive

property the 198- Dodge "\: . • automobile
arii I , a] 1 : f i I
possession,

,

v:::c;

•

which is valued at $8: ,
i i "ei ;!::] ;;,, > i

:s \ n i e - : cr: *}*,**.•>

salor. e-Tuipment by September 22,

acy shal 1 retrieve her

l£o3, cr such items will

d-^< - .. ..:.:.
33.
equipment
C .

The Court finds the value of Larry's business

^ e t b c v " h^-d

r

'^ ^^^^ ~^> ,- -~^ name? ?f a n y

:

parries' right, t. ~~ ar.:; interest:
Corporation

a~i -

property, fixtures
receivable
T

^
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equipment, inventory, accc'-i.r^
y
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j
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whether now known or
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stat:

^ 1 :axing autho - . . -. s .
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34.

Except as otherwise set forth herein, each party

shall be awarded the personal property presently in his or her
possession, free of any claims of the other.
35.

Under the circumstances of this case, the Court

finds such division of marital property to be fair and equitable.
The Court is aware that this division of property slightly favors
Larry using the values that the Court has found, but the Court
feels that Larry is actually receiving less hard value,
particularly because the Court has assumed the value of the State
Street property to be $100,000, when in fact it may be less.
MARITAL DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS
36.

As set forth above, Tracy shall be ordered to

assume and satisfy all obligations associated with the Riverton
property, and Larry shall be ordered to assume and satisfy
obligations associated with the Sandy property, as well as those
associated with his business.
37.

The parties shall each be responsible for one-half

of the debts owing to the Grace Lutheran Church in the
approximate amount of $8,380, and to Allied Collection in the
approximate amount of $1,187.
38.

Each party shall be ordered to assume and satisfy

all remaining obligations that are in his or her name, holding
the other harmless thereon, including any obligations that are
assessed against the parties by state or federal taxing
authorities.
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39.

The Court finds that Larry is delinquent in his

prior child support payments in the amount of $8,483.36.
Judgment shall enter against him in this amount.
ALIMONY
40.

The Court finds that alimony is not warranted in

this case, now or ever.

The parties' incomes and needs are

comparable, and neither party has the ability to pay alimony to
the other.

Accordingly, no alimony shall be awarded.

Moreover,

the Court finds that the temporary alimony order was improperly
entered, and such order is hereby vacated.
RETIREMENT PLANS AND SECURITIES
41.

Each party shall be awarded all such accounts that

are in his or her name, free of any claim of the other.
FEES AND COSTS
42.

The Court finds that both parties are comparably

able to pay their fees.

Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that

Mr. Jackson had to take this case over on short notice.

The

Court believes it to be equitable to order Larry to assist in the
payment of Mr. Jackson's fees in the amount of $4,000, and
judgment shall enter against Larry in this amount.

All other

fees shall be the sole responsibility of the party who incurred
them.
43.

The parties shall be ordered to cooperate with

each other, and to cause any corporation or trust to cooperate in
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executing the appropriate documents to carry out the terms of
these findings.
MISCELLANEOUS
44.

The Court has fully resolved the issues involving

the identification and division of marital property.

The Court

finds that Tracy has no residual interest in any trusts that have
been the subject of this litigation.

The Court further finds

that this action should be dismissed as to the trusts, Robin
Larson, and Lawrence Jacobsen, with prejudice.
45.

The Court has also resolved the question of Bonnie

Miller's involvement in this matter.

The Court finds Tracy's

claims against Ms. Miller to be without merit, and that such
action should be dismissed, with prejudice.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioner shall be awarded a decree of divorce on

the ground of irreconcilable differences.
2.

A Decree of Divorce shall be entered that is

consistent with the foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED this

<

fP^tey

of /^sLfrU^l^

1999.

Approvad as to form:

4tfpw.A^
W.^e^in Jackson
Attorneys for petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
•oregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the
:ollowing on October 25, 1999:
W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Franklin L. Slaugh
880 East 9400 South, Suite 103
Sandy, Utah 84094
Gary A. Weston
NIELSEN Sc SENIOR
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM
450 South State Street
A
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
n It \

\

noon

ADDENDUM
NO. 3

TWrd Judicial Olttrtct

WAR U
JAMES H. WOODALL {5361)
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for respondent
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-043 5

owuva**
ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OP SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
* * * * * * *

TRACY L. MILLER,

ORDER IN RE CONTEMPT,
AND JUDGMENT

Petitioner,
vs.
LARRY T. MILLER,

Civil No. 95-4901732 DA
Respondent.
Judge David S. Young
* * * * *

Respondent's Motions for Orders to Show Cause, filed
November 18, 1999 and December 28, 1999, and certified for
evidentiary hearing on December 7, 1999 and January 24, 2000,
came on for hearing on February 25, 2000 before the Honorable
David S. Young.

Petitioner was present and represented by

W. Kevin Jackson. Respondent was present and represented by
James H. Woodall.
Litem.

Penny Breiman appeared as the Guardian Ad

Petitioner's request for a full evidentiary hearing was

granted, and a full day hearing was conducted.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and affidavits
on file, having heard the testimony of the parties and their
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witnesses, and having considered the arguments of counsel, makes
the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order:
1.

Petitioner's procedural objections regarding

jurisdiction, personal service, and the lack of an affidavit are
denied.

Petitioner was served by mail through counsel, and she

was physically present in court at this and the prior hearings.
Respondent's verified memorandum i3 the equivalent of an
affidavit.
2.

Petitioner is in contempt of Court in the

following respects:
a.

For denying respondent's visitation with the

parties' minor child, Stephanie, during the Halloween
weekend of October 29-31, 1999;
b.

For taking Stephanie from respondent's

custody at the hockey game on November 20, 1999.

She

knew this was respondent's weekend with the children,
and she had no conversation with respondent before or
after taking Stephanie.
c.

For taking respondent's personal computer

from his home on November 10, 1999.

She knew this

would create a serious problem, yet she went ahead and
took it. This was completely out of line.
d.

For encouraging Stephanie to prepare an

affidavit against respondent.

13019

-2-

This was improper to
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begin with, and improvident on the part of counsel, as
the Guardian Ad Litem was not even notified.
e.

For coming to respondent's property on

Monday, December 20, 1999, in violation of the Court's
restraining order dated December 7, 1999, and removing
the children from respondent's custody.

Petitioner had

no conversation with respondent regarding this action,
and she knew that he objected to her taking the
children.
g.

For removing the children from school on

December 21 and 22, 1999, without respondent's consent.
She checked with no one, relying instead on the
children to decide whether they wanted to miss school
to go on vacation in Arizona.
3.

Not only has petitioner violated the language of

the Court's prior orders, she has violated the intent and spirit
of the decree, openly and flagrantly interfering with
respondent's visitation and parental rights.
be justified.

Her conduct can1not

Petitioner has called the police in Stephanie's

presence, thrusting her into the dispute.

She does not respect

respondent's right to communicate with his daughter.

She refuses

to communicate with respondent, ignoring his calls, and she has
refused to allow the grandmother to pick up Stephanie when
respondent was working.

This is all inappropriate.
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4.

The Court recommends that both parties have voice

mail or answering machines in order to facilitate communications.
There shall be full and open communication between the parties,
both with each other and with the children.
shall be nonconfrontational,

All communication

The parties are encouraged to

modify or dissolve the restraining orders and protective orders
that are outstanding in order to foster a more open and positive
relationship.
5.

Respondent has not requested that petitioner be

jailed, and jail will therefore not be imposed.

The Court,

however, is of the opinion that ten days in jail would have been
appropriate under the facts of this case.

This is at least the

fifth time petitioner's contempt for this kind of conduct has
been certified.
6.

The Court orders petitioner to pay the attorneys

fees and costs that respondent has incurred in this matter.
Judgment is hereby entered against petitioner, and in favor of
respondent for $1,868.75.

This does not include the prior

judgment for $350.00 entered against petitioner, which remains in
effect.

The Court finds that this amount is reasonable, and that

such fees were necessarily incurred.
7.

Petitioner's objections to the Commissioner's

Recommendations and Orders following the November 18 and
December 7, 1999 hearings are denied.
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8.

If there is another problem of a similar nature,

jail will be imposed on the offending party or parties.

DATED this &JL day of

f$(L-\ <>A

2000.

BY THE COURT >•

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order to the following on February 28, 2000:
W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Penny Breiman
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(

S.././A
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13019
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ADDENDUM
NO. 4

'MAGEO
a Ju

<3taat District

JAMES H. WOODALL (53 61)
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for respondent
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
* * * * * * *

ENTERS IN WASTRY

TRACY L. MILLER,
DATE

Petitioner,

*-

U

RECOMMENDATION, ORDER
AND JUDGMENT

vs,
LARRY T. MILLER, et al,

Civil No. 95-4901732 DA
Respondents.
Judge David S. Young
* * * * *

Respondent's Motion for Order to Show Cause, filed
November 18, 1999, came on for hearing before Commissioner
Michael S. Evans on December 7, 1999.
represented by W. Kevin Jackson.

Petitioner was present and

Respondent was present and

represented by James H. Woodall.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and affidavits
on file, having considered the arguments and proffers of the
parties, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Despite respondent's physical presence in court,

the Court is precluded from certifying contempt without an

i iifti urn mi urn mil urn inn urn imiTit mi
Recommendation, Order and Judgment @
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affidavit on file.

The Court believes petitioner's behavior,

both for having the children remove personal property from
respondent's residence, and for taking Stephanie from
respondent's custody during visitation, clearly rises to the
level of contempt, but her contempt is reserved at this time.
2.

The Court finds it totally disingenuous for

petitioner to suggest that an eight-year-old child wrote the
affidavit that was submitted on her behalf.

Involving the child

in this manner is highly inappropriate, and it represents a
further violation of the prior order of the Court that the
parties not involve the children in this dispute.

Moreover, it

is a clear violation of paragraph 12 of the Decree, which
requires both parties to use their best efforts to foster a
positive relationship between the children and the other parent.
3.

The Court, sua sponte, orders petitioner not to

again submit affidavits from any of the minor children.
Petitioner is again admonished not to discuss this matter with
the children or involve them in any way.
4.
granted.

Respondent's request for a restraining order is

Petitioner is hereby restrained from going on or about

the property of respondent, or the property of respondent's
mother, Bonnie Miller, except to pick up or drop off the children
for regularly scheduled visitation.

Exchanges are to be made

curbside, and petitioner is not to exit her vehicle.

00006s)

5.

Petitioner is further restrained from inviting the

children to abandon respondent when they are in his custody,
during visitation or otherwise.
6.

Respondent's request for make-up visitation

regarding his loss of the Halloween 1999 weekend with Stephanie
is reserved.
7.

Petitioner's conduct has been egregious. Having

found that respondent has incurred $350 in attorney's fees, and
that such amount is both reasonable and was necessarily incurred,
judgment is hereby entered against petitioner, in favor of
respondent, for $3 50.
DATED this J2^Vf day of 7)-<^<-^^A^^-

^Jf

BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT O
DATED this \ \

day of

^ J > J

K

zx

BY THE COURT:

J
MICHAEL S . EVANS v
^<^
DISTRICT COURT COMMISSIONER

Approved a s t o

y for

form:

petitioner
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ADDENDUM
NO. 5

JAMES H. WOODALL (53 61)
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for respondent
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
* * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION
FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

TRACY L. MILLER,
Petitioner,
vs.

Civil No. 95-4901732 DA

LARRY T. MILLER,

Judge David S. Young

Respondent.
* * * * * * *

Respondent submits the following memorandum in support
of his Motion for Order to Show Cause, filed- herewith:
INTRODUCTION
Following four years of litigation which culminated in
a trial in August 1999, the parties were awarded split physical
custody of their three children.

Petitioner has custody of

Stephanie, who is eight, and respondent has custody of Jeron and
Brady, who are sixteen and fourteen years old, respectively.
This is the fifth time respondent has had to seek the Court's
assistance in forcing petitioner's compliance with the Court's
orders.

BACKGROUND
At the last hearing on December 7, 1999, this Court
restrained petitioner from going on or about the property of
respondent, or the property of respondent's mother, except to
pick up or drop off the children for regularly scheduled
visitation.

The Court further restrained petitioner from taking

or inviting the children to abandon respondent when they are in
his custody.

This order was made necessary by petitioner's

refusal to follow any visitation schedule.
Less than two weeks later, respondent learned from the
boys that petitioner was planning to take them out of school and
go to Arizona for an extended visit with petitioner's parents.
Through counsel, he sent a letter on December 17 advising her not
to remove the children from school. A copy of the letter is
attached as Exhibit A.

On December 20, 1999, petitioner went to

respondent's home while he was at work and took the boys.

Both

boys, who are struggling in school, missed two days of classes
and were charged with unexcused absences.
Respondent is tired of returning to Court, but he does
not know what else to do.

If petitioner would follow the

visitation schedule there would be no problems.

She refuses to

recognize that respondent has any parental rights, or that this
Court has any authority over her.

DISCUSSION
1.

Contempt for coming to respondent's home.

Petitioner had no right to go to respondent's home on
December 20, 1999.

If there was any prior misunderstanding, that

was cleared up on December 7, 1999.

Petitioner was present at

that hearing, and she knows exactly what the Court ordered.

She

should be held in contempt for this violation of the Court's
order.
2.

Contempt for taking the boys.

The statutory-

visitation schedule is in effect. As the boys' noncustodial
parent, petitioner's holiday visitation with the boys was to
begin after school on December 23, 1999.
take them two days early.

She had no right to

Nor was there a misunderstanding;

petitioner knew that respondent would not allow her-to take the
boys early.

She chose ta disregard respondent's parental rights

and the authority of the Court.

She should be held in contempt

for this conduct as well.
3.

Contempt for taking the boys out of school. As

the noncustodial parent, petitioner has no right to remove the
children from school without respondent's permission.

Petitioner

knows that the boys are struggling, and she is quick to blame
respondent for the problem.
when she took the boys.

She did not even notify the schools

She should be held in contempt for

interfering with respondent's parental rights.

4.

Contempt for visitation interference.

As of the

date of this memorandum, respondent has not had visitation with
his daughter since November 13, 1999.

Petitioner has caller ID,

and she will not take respondent's calls, and she makes it a
point not to be home when respondent attempts to exercise
visitation with Stephanie,

Petitioner needs to be held in

contempt on this point as well.
5.

Certifying prior contempt.

By this memorandum,

respondent verifies as true and correct all factual statements he
proffered to the Court on December 7. The absence of his
affidavit was the only reason the Court reserved rather than
certified petitioner's contempt.

It is now clear that she does

not feel any obligation to comply with any order of this Court.
Respondent requests that petitioner's prior contempt be certified
as well.
6.

Fees.

Every time respondent is forced to return

to Court, he expends attorney's fees, and he loses time at work.
He should not have to do this.

It is reasonable and appropriate

that petitioner be assessed $375, representing the attorney's
fees that respondent has incurred in bringing this before the
Court.
DATED this J ^

day of December 1999.

/Counsel for respondent

STATE OF UTAH

)

SALT LAKE COUNTY

)

ss.

Larry T. Miller, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states that he has read and understands the foregoing document,
and that the information it contains is true.

MILLER
The foregoing document was acknowledged before me by
Larry T. Miller on December 24, 1999.
«
N0TARYPU8UC

JAMES ft WOODALL
428 South 500 East
ttftUkftOfeUT 84102
IfcCoaototan Eniret: 1-27-2001
Statoofutah

issssssssssesssssssss^r^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM -to the following on December 24, 1999:
W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Penny Breiman
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

LlTTLEFIELD & PETERSON

EXHIBIT "A"

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
426 SOUTH FIFTH EAST

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
(801)531-0435

FACSIMILE NO

AVID E LlTTLEFIELD

(801)575-7834

PAUL WOOD
NNL WASSERMANN
UZANNE MARELIUS
RNOLDG GARDNER. JR

CRAIG M PETERSON

*MES H WOODALL

(1942-1994)

MICE R OLSON

December 17, 1999
W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Miller v. Miller

Dear Kevin:
My client has advised me that Tracy is planning to take the boys out of school
on Wednesday and Thursday of next week. As you know, both children are struggling in
school, and they can not afford to miss any classes. Jeron is in night school, and he is only
allowed two absences. Both children have full days of school on both days. Please advise
your client that she is not to remove either child from school.
Also, if your client intends to take the children out of town, please be sure she
provides Larry with the address and telephone number where she can be reached.

Sincerely,

cc:

Larry T. Miller
Penny Breiman, Guardian Ad Litei

2.

Finding petitioner in contempt of Court for

taking the children from respondent's custody on
Monday, December 20, 1999, in direct contravention of
the Court's order dated December 7, 1999;
3.

Finding petitioner in contempt of Court for

removing the children from school on December 21
and 22, 1999, without respondent's consent.
4.

Finding petitioner in contempt of Court for

denying respondent all visitation with the parties'
eight-year-old daughter, Stephanie since the hearing on
December 7, 1999;
5.

Certifying all issues regarding petitioner's

contempt which were reserved on December 7, 1999; and
6.

Ordering petitioner to pay $350 to offset the

attorney's fees and costs that respondent has incurred
in bringing this before the Court.
DATED this «JT

day of January 2000.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I hand mailed a true and correct copy o
foregoing ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE to the following on January
, 2000:
W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Penny Breiman
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ADDENDUM
NO. 6

Third Judicial District
JAMES H. WOODALL (5361)
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for respondent
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435

NOV 18 1999
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
* * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION
FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

TRACY L. MILLER,
Petitioner,
vs.

Civil No. 95-4901732 DA
LARRY T. MILLER,
Judge David S. Young
Respondent.
* * * * *

Respondent submits the following memorandum in support
of his Motion for Order to Show Cause, filed herewith:
INTRODUCTION
After four years of litigation, a decree of divorce was
finally entered on November 8, 1999.

Problems have continued.

This motion seeks an order finding petitioner in contempt,
ordering her to return personal property she took from respondent
after the decree was entered, and clearly defining petitioner's
parental rights when the children are in respondent's care.
BACKGROUND
This has been a high conflict proceeding since it was
filed in April 1995.

Petitioner has routinely ignored orders and

admonishments from the Court.

Her contempt, for interfering with

respondent's parental rights, was certified twice.

She was

repeatedly advised that the Court would change its temporary
custody order and send the children to live with their father if
her misconduct continued.
Such an order never became necessary; the two boys
ultimately refused to live with petitioner, and they moved in
with respondent.

Following a two day trial in August 1999, a

split custody order was entered, with petitioner having custody
of Stephanie, who is eight, and respondent being awarded custody
of Jeron and Brady, who are sixteen and fourteen, respectively.
The final decree was entered on November 8, 1999.

Petitioner has

advised respondent that she will appeal the Court's decision,
ensuring years of continuing litigation.
The specific problems respondent seeks the Court's
assistance on are as follows:
1.

The weekend of October 2 9-31 was respondent's

weekend for all three children.

Petitioner refused to allow him

to have Stephanie.
2.

On November 10, 1999, petitioner picked Brady up

from school and took him to respondent's home while respondent
was at work.

While petitioner sat in her car, she sent Brady

inside to bring out respondent's personal computer, which she
took.

3.

On November 20, 1999, respondent had all three

children for weekend visitation.
in West Valley City.
disappeared.

He took them to a hockey game

At the conclusion of the game, Stephanie

Respondent, who had noticed petitioner during the

game, suspected that petitioner might have taken Stephanie.

He

called the police, who located Stephanie at petitioner's home.
DISCUSSION
1.

The computer.

There is nothing in the Decree

which would permit petitioner to take respondent's computer.

It

is a Hewlett-Packard 266 with a 56k modem, keyboard, monitor, and
speakers.

Petitioner should be ordered immediately return this

property to respondent, or reimburse him its current value of
$1,500.
2.

Contempt (computer).

Petitioner has been

admonished not to involve the children_in this dispute.
Paragraph 12 of the Decree restrains the parties from "doing
anything that is intended or would reasonably be expected to
adversely affect the other party's relationship with the
children."

Brady's relationship with respondent was damaged by

the computer incident.

For petitioner to instruct her fourteen

year old son to remove personal property from his father's home
is deplorable.

Petitioner should be found in contempt for this

conduct.
4.

Contempt (hockey game).

Petitioner had no right

to take Stephanie from the hockey game, particularly without even

discussing the matter with respondent.

Petitioner should be

found in contempt for this conduct.
5.

Restraining order.

Petitioner habitually comes on

and about respondent's property and that of his mother's without
notice or invitation.

It is reasonable and appropriate that

petitioner be restrained from coming on or about any of
respondent's property, or that of respondent's mother, for any
reason except to drop off or pick up the children.
should also be

Petitioner

ordered not to exit her vehicle when she does so.

Petitioner should also be restrained petitioner from approaching
the children or inviting them to abandon respondent when they are
in his custody.
6.

Make-up visitation.

Respondent should be awarded

overnight visitation with Stephanie for Halloween 2000 as make-up
visitation for Halloween 1999, which was improperly denied by
petitioner.
7.

Fees.

This motion was made necessary entirely by

petitioner's misconduct.

It is reasonable and appropriate that

she be ordered to pay $350 to offset the attorney's fees and
costs that respondent has incurred in bringing this before the
Court.
DATED this

/ & day of November 1999.

J^S^HV-WOODALL
raunsel for respondent
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450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
* * * * * * *

TRACY L. MILLER,

RESPONDENT'S MOTION
FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Petitioner,
vs.

Civil No. 95-4901732 DA
LARRY T. MILLER,
Judge David S. Young
Respondent.
* * * * *

Respondent respectfully moves the Court for an order
requiring petitioner to appear and show cause, if any, why the
Court should not grant the following relief:
1.

Ordering petitioner to immediately return the

personal computer which she removed from respondent's home on
November 10, 1999;
2.

Finding petitioner in contempt of Court for

involving the parties' minor child, Brady, in this dispute by
instructing him to bring the computer outside to her;
3.

Finding petitioner in contempt of Court for taking

the parties' minor child, Stephanie, from respondent during a
hockey game on November 20, 1999 without notice to respondent;

4.

Restraining petitioner from coming on or about any

of respondent's property, or that of respondent's mother, for any
reason except to drop off or pick up the children, and ordering
petitioner not to exit her vehicle when she does so;
5.

Restraining petitioner from approaching the

children or inviting them to abandon respondent when the children
are in his custody;
6.

Awarding respondent overnight visitation with

Stephanie for Halloween 2000 as make-up visitation for Halloween
1999, which was denied by petitioner; and
7.

Ordering petitioner to pay $350 to offset the

attorney'-s fees and costs that respondent has incurred in
bringing this before the Court.
A memorandum has been filed in support of this motion.
DATED this

day of November 1999.

UAMEa H. WOODALL
Counsel for respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I hand mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE to the following on
November 18, 1999:
W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

JAMES H. WOODALL (5361)
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for respondent
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
* * * * * * *

TRACY L, MILLER,

)

Petitioner,
vs.
LARRY T. MILLER,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Civil No. 95-4901732 DA
Judge David S. Young

* * * * *

After consideration of respondent's Motion for Order to
Show Cause, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner appear before the
Honorable Commissioner-Susan C. Bradford at the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, 450 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah, on

19 (LtlArJiH^

"7 ;

1999 at

/ 10 C <lwv_

to show cause, if any, as to why the Court should not grant the
following relief:
1.

Ordering petitioner to immediately return the

personal computer which she removed from respondent's
home on November 10, 1999;
2.

Finding petitioner in contempt of Court for

dispute by instructing him to bring the computer
outside to her;
3.

Finding petitioner in contempt of Court for

taking the parties' minor child, Stephanie, from
respondent during a hockey game on November 20, 1999
without notice to respondent;
4.

Restraining petitioner from coming on or

about any of respondent's property, or that of
respondent's mother, for any reason except to drop off
or pick up the children, and ordering petitioner not to
exit her vehicle when she does so;
5.

Restraining petitioner from approaching the

children or inviting them to abandon respondent when
the children are in his custody;
6.

Awarding respondent overnight visitation with

Stephanie for Halloween 2000 as make-up visitation for
Halloween 1999, which was denied by petitioner; and
7.

Ordering petitioner to pay $350 to offset the

attorney's fees and costs that respondent has incurred
in bringing this before the Court.
DATED this

[tf

day of November 1999.
BY THE COURT:

Jiviuuais wiih ais30!'it»p^ neeomp speaa: accommodations
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l
Oonjre:cr ^dnng impaired 238-7391.
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I certify that I hand mailed a true and correct copy of
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W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State Street, Suite 300
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450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

